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Abstract. The author hypothesizes that variation in features of representational
tools can have a significant effect on collaborative learning discourse, and hence on
learning outcomes. Representational tools mediate collaborative learning discourse
by providing learners with the means to express their emerging knowledge in a
persistent medium, where the knowledge then becomes part of the shared context.
The representational bias of these tools constrains the knowledge that can be
expressed, and makes some of that knowledge more salient and hence a likely topic
of discussion. This paper sketches a theoretical analysis of the roles of constraint
and salience in the effect of representational bias on collaborative learning
discourse, and suggests a research agenda for systematic investigation of these
claims.
1 Introduction
The AI&ED community is witnessing an increased interest in software that provides learners
with the means to construct and manipulate knowledge artifacts at their own initiative while
interacting with other learners. This trend reflects decades of research into cognitive and
social aspects of learning [6], which has developed a clear picture of the importance of
learners’ active involvement in the expression, examination, and manipulation of their own
knowledge, as well as the equal importance of guidance provided by social processes and
mentorship. There is a need for an empirically grounded theory of design for discourse – one
that tells us how representational tools and collaborative learning processes can be designed
together for more effective learning [24]. The present paper takes a step in this direction.
Based on experience with “Belvedere,” a software environment that supports collaborative
learning of inquiry skills with a shared workspace for constructing “evidence maps,” the
author postulates that the representational bias of tools such as Belvedere can influence
collaborative learning discourse in educationally significant ways. This paper sketches a
theoretical account of the expected effects, outlines a research agenda, and comments on
implications for AI&ED.
2 Representations in Critical Inquiry Software
To provide examples and motivation for discussion, several alternate representational
approaches taken in computer supported collaborative learning (CSCL) systems for critical
inquiry are characterized below.
Hypertext/hypermedia systems include CLARE [31], CSILE [25], the Collaboratory
Notebook [17], Web-Camile and Web-SMILE [8]. (Seminal systems include gIBIS and
NoteCards, which were not developed for educational applications.) These systems all have
in common a linking of different comments relevant to an issue, usually with categorization
of the hyperlinks or their targets with labels such as “answer, argument, problem, solution,
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comment,” etc. There is wide variation in this category: some
take the form of a threaded discussion or other tree structure that
may be viewed in summary form (see Figure 1 for a
characterization), while others support construction of graphs of
“nodes” or “cards” through which one navigates, viewing one
card at a time. Mature systems such as CSILE or its successor,
Knowledge Forum, use several of the representational
approaches discussed herein.
Several argument mapping environments, including Belvedere
[28, 29], ConvinceMe [21], and Euclid [26], utilize node-link
graphs representing rhetorical, logical, or evidential relationships
between assertions (usually categorized as “hypothesis” versus
“data” or “evidence”). Belvedere is characterized in Figure 2
(rounded shapes represent hypotheses and rectangles represent
empirical observations). The entire graph is viewed and
manipulated at once, distinguishing these systems from
hypermedia environments in which one normally views and
manipulates one node of the graph
at a time.
SenseMaker [1] exemplifies an intermediate approach
between graphs and hierarchies. Statements are organized in a
2-dimensional space and viewed all at once, as in argument
graphs (see Figure 3). However, SenseMaker uses containment
rather than links to represent the relationship of evidential
support: an empirical statement is placed inside the box of the
theory it supports. SenseMaker also uses containment to
represent decomposition of a theory into hypotheses, a feature
that was tried in early versions of Belvedere.
Finally, another representation is an evidence or criteria
matrix. Several forms are possible. One organizes
hypotheses (or solutions) along one axis, and empirical
evidence (or criteria) along another, with matches between
the two being expressed symbolically in the cells of the
matrix (e.g., Figure 4). Puntambekar et al. [20]
experimented with a matrix representation in a paper-based
collaboration tool.
Examining the figures above, the differences in representational notations provided by
existing software for critical inquiry is striking. Yet more striking is the fact that there appear
to be no systematic studies comparing the effects of external representations on collaborative
learning discourse, although a number of valuable studies have been conducted on software
utilizing single representational notations. Exceptions include [7, 33]. Given that these
representations define the fundamental character of software intended to guide learning, a
systematic comparison is overdue. The next section sketches a theoretical perspective to
guide this research agenda.
3 A Theoretical Account
We begin with definitions. Representational tools are artifacts (such as software) with which
users construct, examine, and manipulate external representations of their knowledge. The
present analysis is concerned with symbolic as opposed to analogical representations. A
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notation/artifact distinction is critical to the present work: A representational tool is an
implementation of a representational notation that provides a set of primitive elements out
of which representations can be constructed. (For example, in Figure 2 the representational
notation is the collection of primitives for making hypothesis and data statements and “+”
and “-” links, along with rules for their use.) Developers choose a representational notation
and instantiate it as a representational tool, while the user of the tool constructs particular
representational artifacts in the tool. (For example, in Figure 2 the representational artifact
is the particular diagram of evidence for competing explanations of mass extinctions.)
Learning interactions includes interactions between learners and the representations,
between learners and other learners, and between learners and mentors such as teachers or
pedagogical software. The present analysis focuses on interactions between learners and
other learners, specifically verbal and gestural interactions termed collaborative learning
discourse.
3.1 Representational Bias
Each given representational notation manifests a particular representational bias, expressing
certain aspects of one’s knowledge better than others [30]. The phrase knowledge unit is
used to refer generically to components of knowledge one might wish to represent, such as
hypotheses, statements of fact, concepts, relationships, rules, etc. Representational bias
manifests in two major ways: Constraints: limits on logical expressiveness, and in the
sequence in which knowledge units can be expressed [22, 27]; and Salience: how the
representation facilitates processing of certain knowledge units, possibly at the expense of
others [12]. Representational tools mediate collaborative learning discourse by providing
learners with the means to articulate emerging knowledge in a persistent medium,
inspectable by all participants, where the knowledge then becomes part of the shared
context. Representational bias constrains the knowledge that can be expressed in the shared
context, and makes some of that knowledge more salient and hence a likely topic of
discussion. Sources of constraint and salience are discussed below.
Zhang [34] distinguishes cognitive and perceptual operators in reasoning with
representations. Cognitive operations operate on internal representations; while perceptual
operations operate on external representations. Perceptual operations take place without
making an internal copy of the representation, although internal representations may change
as a result of these operations. Expressed in terms of Zhang’s framework, the present
analysis is concerned primarily with perceptual operations on external representations. This
is because the analysis is concerned with how representations that reside in learners'
perceptually shared context mediate collaborative learning interactions. While it is the case
that cognitive operations on internal representations will influence interactions in the social
realm, CSCL system builders do not design internal representations – they design tools for
constructing external representations.
Stenning and Oberlander [27] distinguish constraints inherent in the logical properties of a
representational notation from constraints arising from the architecture of the agent using
the representational notation. This corresponds roughly to the present author’s distinction
between “constraints” and “salience.” Constraints arise from logical limits on the information
that can be expressed in the representational notation, while salience arises from how easily
the agent recovers the information (via perception) from the representational artifacts.
Information that is recoverable from a representation is salient to the extent to which it is
recoverable by automatic perceptual processing rather than through a controlled sequence of
perceptual operators [13, 34].
The discussion now turns to predictions based on differences between representational
notations.
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3.2 Representational Notations have Ontological Bias
The first major hypothesis claims that important guidance for learning interactions comes
from ways in which a representational notation limits what can be represented [22, 27]. A
representational notation provides a set of primitive elements out of which representational
artifacts are constructed. These primitive elements constitute an “ontology” of categories
and structures for organizing the task domain. Learners will see their task in part as one of
making acceptable representational artifacts out of these primitives. Thus, they will search
for possible new instances of the primitive elements, and hence (according to this
hypothesis) will be biased to think about the task domain in terms of the underlying
ontology.
3.3 Salient Knowledge Units Receive More Elaboration
This hypothesis states that learners will be more likely to attend to, and hence elaborate on,
the knowledge units that are perceptually salient in their shared representational workspace
than those that are either not salient or for which a representational proxy has not been
created. The visual presence of the knowledge unit in the shared representational context
serves as a reminder of its existence and any work that may need to be done with it. Also, it
is easier to refer to a knowledge unit that has a visual manifestation, so learners will find it
easier to express their subsequent thoughts about this unit than about those that require
complex verbal descriptions [3]. These claims apply to any visually shared representations.
However, to the extent that two representational notations differ in kinds of knowledge units
they make salient, these functions of reminding and ease of reference will encourage
elaboration on different kinds of knowledge units. The ability to manipulate learners’
elaborations is important because substantial psychological research shows that elaboration
leads to positive learning outcomes (e.g., [2, 5]).
For example, consider the three representations of a relationship between four statements
shown in Figure 5. The relationship is one of evidential support. The middle notation uses an
implicit device, containment, to represent evidential support, while the right-hand notation
uses an explicit device, an arc. It becomes easier to perceive and refer to the relationship as
an object in its own right as one moves from left to right in the figure. Hence the present
hypothesis claims that relationships will receive more elaboration in the rightmost
representational notation. The opposite prediction could be made in situations where learners
see their task as one of putting knowledge units “in their place” in the representational
environment. Once a unit is put in its place, learners may feel it can be safely ignored as they
move on to other units not yet placed. This suggests the importance of making missing
knowledge salient. 
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Graph: Relationship as object of
perception.
Figure 5. Example of Elaboration Hypothesis
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3.4 Salience of Missing Knowledge Units Guides Search
Some representational notations provide structures for organizing knowledge units, in
addition to primitives for construction of individual knowledge units. Unfilled “fields” in
these organizing structures, if perceptually salient, can make missing knowledge units as
salient as those that are present. If the representational notation provides structures with
predetermined fields that need to be filled with knowledge units, the present hypothesis
predicts that learners will try to fill these fields.
For example, Figure 6 shows artifacts from three representational notations that differ in
salience of missing evidential relationships. In the textual representation, no particular
relationships are salient as missing: no particular prediction about search for new knowledge
units can be made. In the graph representation, the lack of connectivity of the volcanic
hypothesis to the rest of the graph is salient. However, once some connection is made to one
data item, the hypothesis will appear connected, so one might predict that only one
relationship involving each object will be sought. In the matrix representation, all
undetermined relationships are salient as empty cells. The present hypothesis predicts that
learners will be more likely to discuss all possible relationships between objects when using
matrices.
4 A Research Agenda
Substantial research has been conducted concerning the role of external representations in
individual problem solving, generally showing that the kind of external representation used
to depict a problem may determine the ease with which the problem is solved [11, 12, 14,
34]. One might ask whether this research is sufficient to predict the effects of representations
in collaborative learning. A related but distinct line of work undertaken in collaborative
learning contexts is needed for several reasons. The interaction of the cognitive processes of
several agents is different than the reasoning of a single agent [16, 19], so may be affected
by external representations in different ways. In particular, shared external representations
can be used to coordinate distributed work, and will serve this function different ways
according to their representational biases. Also, the mere presence of representations in a
shared context with collaborating agents may change each individual’s cognitive processes.
One person can ignore discrepancies between thought and external representations, but an
individual working in a group must constantly refer back to the shared external
representation while coordinating activities with others. Thus it is conceivable that external
representations have a greater effect on individual cognition in a social context than they do
when working alone (Micki Chi, personal communication). Finally, much prior work on the
role of external representations in individual problem solving has used well-defined
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problems. Further study is needed on ill structured, open-ended problems such as those
typical of scientific inquiry.
The author has begun studies that test the effects of representational notations on
collaborative discourse and learning. At this writing, pilot studies have been run and are
under analysis, and a proposal for in-depth study has been funded. Four representational
notations are being compared in a proximal collaborative learning configuration, to test the
predictions of the previous section. The four notations, characterizations of systems being
deployed today, are threaded discussions (Figure 1), graphs (Figure 2), containment (Figure
3), and matrices (Figure 4). The question is not “what system is better?” but rather “what
kinds of interactions, and therefore learning, does each representational notation
encourage?” It may well be the case that all of the above representations are useful, albeit
for different learning and problem solving phases or task domains.
The empirical study intentionally uses representations that differ on more than one feature
(see Table 1). The research strategy is to maximize the opportunity to observe predicted
effects on learners’ discourse and on learning outcomes, in order to explore the large space
of experimental comparisons within the time scale on which collaborative technology is
being adapted. These results will then inform well-motivated selection of studies that vary
one feature at a time as needed to disambiguate alternate representational explanations for
the results. The author hopes that this paper will serve as a call for others to join the effort.
Table 1. Features of Selected Representational Notations
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5 Where’s the Artificial Intelligence?
The phrase “Artificial Intelligence and Education” most immediately brings to mind the
endeavor to build smart machines that teach. Ideally, such machines would “know” a great
deal about a particular subject matter, being able to both articulate concepts and principles
and engage in expert level problem solving. They would also know about pedagogy, being
able to track the progress of individual students and choose the best feedback strategies and
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trajectory through a curriculum for a particular student [32]. This vision of AI&ED might be
termed “strong AI&ED.” Although work on "traditional" intelligent tutoring systems
continues with a recent emphasis on agent-based systems, other work that does not fall
within mainstream AI approaches is increasingly appearing in the AI&ED and ITS
conferences.
Some of this work (e.g., [15, 18]) can be characterized as “minimalist AI&ED.” Instead
of attempting to simulate a teacher and/or model the minds of students, these efforts provide
machines with minimal abilities to respond (in a manner believed to be educationally
relevant) to the semantics of student activities and constructions. This research tests the
educational value of these minimal abilities, and adds functionality as needed to address
deficiencies in the utility of the system. As a research strategy, this incremental approach
ensures that we understand the capabilities and limitations of each representational and
inferential device unencumbered by the simultaneous complexities of an attempted complete
pedagogical agent.
The present article exemplifies a newly emerging third category of AI&ED work, one
that does not attempt to build reasoning machines, even of the minimalist sort, yet which
constitutes a contribution of AI to education, and potentially even a source and test-bed of
AI ideas. This kind of application can be seen most clearly in the design of representational
notations. An artificial intelligence sensitivity to the properties of formal representations for
automated reasoning can be applied to the analysis and design of external representations for
human reasoning as well as machine reasoning. One revisits the notions of epistemological
and heuristic adequacy, but now the interpreter is human and “representational bias”
includes a perceptual component [12, 34]. The AI “in” software systems built under this
approach is residual, influencing the design but being a run-time factor only for human rather
than artificial agents. Examples of work in this category include [4, 9, 10, 23, 27], and the
present work.
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